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1. Introduction 
 
‘Sexting,’ understood as the consensual distribution of self-generated sexually explicit imagery 
through internet-connected mobile devices, 1 has come under severe scrutiny in the UK. This is 
because of the prevalence of sexting, its impact on the sexual lives of adolescents, and the 
illegality of the act when committed by them. However, the current legal analysis of sexting has 
thus far focused on the application of relevant law and the potential sanctions following a 
successful prosecution. However, there are important aspects of sexting which exist beyond the 
legality of the act which need to be considered.  By shedding light on this other dimension, it 
may be possible to avoid future legislation falling into the same trap as the ill-fated and 
paradoxical legislative amendments responsible for the debacle surrounding adolescent sexting. 
To this end, this article offers an original philosophical investigation into sexting, its legal 
significance, and surrounding circumstances. This piece will be adopting a philosophical study of 
ontology to examine sexting and to offer insights into the significance of the social objects, 
created by mobile phones, which constitute this contemporary act.     
 
  On 1 May 2004 the majority of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (SOA 2003) came into force. The 
Act contained an amendment which made it illegal to make, possess, or share indecent images of 
those under 18 years of age, whereas the law had previously only applied to images of those 
under 16 years of age. 2 The amendment also removed an exception which had been tabled by 
                                                          
1 Elizabeth C. Eraker ‘Stemming Sexting: Sensible Legal Approaches to Teenager’s Exchange of Self-Produced 
Pornography’ (2010) Vol.25(1) Annual Review of Law and Technology, Berkeley Technology Law Journal 555, at 
557: ‘Note, the term “sexting” refers to the self-production and distribution by cell phone of sexually explicit images 
in the course of consensual, voluntary activity by teenagers.’   
2 See Sexual Offences Act 2003, s.45.  
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the Lords 3 whereby there would be no crime to answer for if a person of 16 or 17 years of age 
had consented to the taking of a such an image. But with the removal of the exception, s.45 of 
the SOA 2003 effectively raised the age of a ‘child’ from 16 to 18 years old.     
 
  Yet, during the final Commons Standing Committee drafting discussion which removed the 
exception and finalised the amendment, there was no mention of a digital technology which at 
the time was revolutionising the creation, storing, and sharing of images. 4 The technology 
noticeably absent from any discussion was the camera-equipped mobile phone – the first 
generation ‘smartphone’ – which at the time was undergoing an exponential growth in the UK to 
the number of tens of millions. 5 The uptake of this technology was so rapid that even before the 
amended law was in force, Kodak had already stopped selling 35mm cameras in the US and 
Western Europe, due to the pervasiveness of the camera-phone. 6   
 
  As a consequence of the legislature’s lack of consideration of this new technology, when the 
SOA 2003 came into force in 2004, it was already drastically disparate from 21st century society. 
It failed catastrophically to coalesce with a society where smartphones were ubiquitous because 
neither the prevalence nor significance of this technology had been discussed. And in a society 
where ownership of this technology is pervasive, where this device is ‘in our hand, at a hand’s 
reach … the absolute tool, the machine to end all the others because it sums them all up,’ 7 it is 
the smartphone which creates, stores, and shares most of our images. Bernard Harcourt has 
argued that this technological revolution has led to ‘a new political and social condition that is 
                                                          
3 See the Sexual Offences Bill, as brought from the House of Lords on 18 June 2003, s. 47(3)(1): ‘It is not an 
offence under section 1(1)(a) for a person to take or make an indecent photograph of a child under aged 16 or over 
with the consent of the child.’ <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmbills/128/2003128.pdf> 
accessed 30 August 2017.  
4 See SC Deb (B) 18 September 2003, cols 247–258. This was, as it was then called, the Standing Committee debate 
which removed the exception tabled from the Lords. It featured discussions of uploading photographs to the internet 
but the word ‘internet’ was only featured three times. The words ‘digital,’ ‘mobile,’ ‘phone,’ or ‘text,’ are nowhere 
to be found in the debate.    
5 In the month prior to the Commons debate it was reported that by Christmas 2003 the UK was on course to have 
55 million camera-phone users. See –– ‘Camera phone sales set to rocket’ BBC News (19 August 2003) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/3161251.stm> accessed 30 August 2017. 
6 See –– ‘R.I.P. 35mm camera’ BBC News (15 January 2004) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/3399529.stm> 
accessed 30 August 2017.  
7 Maurizio Ferraris, Where Are You? An Ontology of the Cell Phone (Sarah De Sanctis tr, Fordham University Press, 
2014), 46.      
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radically transforming our relations to each other, our political communities, and ourselves.’ 8 He 
argues that through devices such as the smartphone: 
 
we are not so much being coerced, surveilled, or secured today as we are exposing or exhibiting 
ourselves knowingly, many of us willingly, with all our love, lust, passion, and politics, others 
anxiously, ambivalently, even perhaps despite ourselves – but still, knowingly exposing  
ourselves. 9  
 
  But given that the technology enabling this expository era was not given the requisite 
forethought during legislative drafting, the law relevant to sexting was predestined to be 
anachronous to life in the 21st century. In response to previous positivist legal engagements, 10 
this article seeks to broaden our understanding of sexting by shedding light on the crucial, and 
yet neglected, object of the mobile phone. Through this analysis, the article aims to provide a 
more nuanced inquiry into sexting which pays heed to the social, technological, and 
philosophical significance of this millennial tabula.  
 
  Drawing on the deconstructive thought of Jacques Derrida and the related work of Maurizio 
Ferraris, this article deploys philosophy as its methodology because it allows for an insightful 
comment on what it means to use mobile digital technologies to ‘write’ ourselves into the digital 
world. Harcourt explains this world as follows: ‘[o]ver the past ten to fifteen years, our digital 
self – the subject’s second body – has taken on a life of its own and become more tangible than 
our analog self.’ 11 Ferraris’ work is particularly apt in illuminating this digital world because in 
2005, only a year after the SOA was in force, he published a book which Umberto Eco described 
as an ‘“anthropology” of the mobile phone’ 12 and which allowed us to better understand this 
revolutionary device. 13 Such an understanding came via Ferraris’ ‘Derridean’ 14 ontological 
                                                          
8 Bernard Harcourt, Exposed: Desire and Disobedience in the Digital Age (Harvard University Press, 2015), 15. 
9 Ibid. 18.  
10 For example, see Nigel Stone, ‘The “Sexting” Quagmire: Criminal Justice Responses to Adolescent’s Electronic 
Transmission of Indecent Images in the UK and the USA’ (2011) 11(3) Youth Justice 266.   
11 Harcourt (n 8), 253.  
12 Ferraris (n 7), vii. The book in question was Maurizio Ferraris, Dove sei? Ontologia del telefonino (Bompiani, 
2005).   
13 Ferraris (n 7), ix.  
14 Ibid. vii: ‘…we shall see to what extent words like writing, recording and “inscription” prick up a Derridean’s 
ears.’      
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questioning of the mobile phone, meaning an interrogation into the ‘being’ or the ‘reality’ of the 
mobile phone. This inquiry led him to argue that ‘the mobile phone is a writing machine,’15 and 
consequently a ‘formidable tool for constructing social reality.’ 16 They achieve this by ‘writing’ 
a plethora of ‘social objects’ such as emails, SMS and MMS messages, social media posts, and 
other user-generated content, all of which are now utilised as the basis for sexting. Ferraris 
explained the philosophy behind these social objects by showing that ‘at the source of the 
construction of social objects there are social acts fixed by memory,’ 17 as are found in the circuit 
boards of internet-connected mobile phones. 18 However, given that Ferraris’ book was only 
translated into English in 2014, this is the first English-language publication to apply this 
seminal work to legal issues arising from the use of mobile phones, in this instance sexting. As 
Ferraris prophetically wrote over 10 years ago: ‘It’s simple; every technical invention – from the 
club to the lever to the wheel, from the sail to gunpowder to sticky notes – changes people’s 
lives. But life remains situated in a world that has its laws and enforces them.’ 19 And yet, 
despite mobile phones being the dominant causal technology behind sexting, they have not 
received the requisite attention to do justice to this issue. Until such a rigorous philosophical 
examination has taken place and the law is altered to adequately accommodate this technological 
epoch, the current law governing the sexual lives of adolescents will remain a relic in the 21st 
century. 
   
  Beyond this introduction, the article develops over five sections. The first explores the social 
setting of sexting, its legal position, and how authorities have responded to its everyday 
occurrence. The second section then provides an account of Derrida’s philosophy and his work 
on digital technology in the late 20th century. This then leads into the third section which engages 
with the Ferrari’s work as a continuation, and specialisation, of Derrida’s thinking, as applied to 
mobile phones in the 21st century, explaining how they ‘write’ our world. The penultimate 
                                                          
15 Ibid. 1 
16 Ibid. 6.  
17 Maurizio Ferraris, Documentality: Why It is Necessary to Leave Traces (Richard Davies tr, Fordham University 
Press, 2013), 165.   
18 Ferraris (n 7), 7: ‘[S]ocial ontology lies on a writing system, which can very well do without mobile phones (it 
already existed in the age of Sumerians and Pharaohs), but which mobile phones perfectly embody, allowing or 
promising the connection to all systems for oral or written communication; the access to all record circuits (writing, 
images, music); the possibility to check one’s bank account, to pay for bus or opera tickets and, if one wishes to, to 
download this book so as to read it on the train.’  
19 Ibid. 36.  
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section then re-examines sexting via the lens of the ‘writing’ emanating from the ever-connected, 
‘wired, plugged in, online,’ mobile phone,’ 20 which has outpaced society’s contemporary laws. 
The fifth and concluding section then looks to legislative developments in Australia which could 
point the way forward in terms of addressing the ill-fated law surrounding sexting.         
 
2. Sexting: Statistics, law, and commentary. 
 
An introduction to sexting. 
 
  From the available quantitative and qualitative data on sexting – the consensual sharing of self-
generated sexual imagery via internet-connected mobile technology – the prevalence of the act is 
significant. 21 Although quantitative studies are limited in accuracy, it is estimated that ‘about a 
third of teenagers’ in the United States are involved in the act. 22 In Britain, according to a 2016 
investigation by The Times which dated back to 2012 and which covered 50 of the country’s 
biggest secondary schools, it was found ‘that 44,112 secondary school pupils have been caught 
sexting in the past three years.’ 23 The report notes this is only a conservative estimate given that 
schools will not be aware of many cases. Another recent report notes that children as young as 
seven have been investigated by police with regards to sexting. 24 Finally, the ground-breaking 
                                                          
20 Harcourt (n 8), 19. 
21 See Claire Perry, ‘Independent Parliamentary Inquiry into Online Child Protection: Findings and 
Recommendations’ (18th April 2012). This Inquiry, which found that between ‘10%-12% of young teenagers [are] 
involved in sharing intimate images of themselves’ (Ibid. 44) - notwithstanding the sharing of intimate images of 
others - led to Baroness Howe of Ilicote’s Private Members Bill from the House of Lords, entitled the ‘Online Safety 
Bill.’ See: <http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2012-13/onlinesafety.html> accessed 30 August 2017. See also Elena 
Martellozzo, Andy Monaghan, Joanna R. Alder, Julia Davidson, Rodolfo Leyva, and Miranda A.H. Horvath, ‘“…I 
wasn’t sure it was normal to watch it…”: A quantitative and qualitative examination of the impact of online 
pornography on the values, attitudes, beliefs and behaviours of children and young people’ (15th June 2016). This 
study, drawing on online forums, focus groups, and surveys, found that of the ‘135 young people [that] had taken 
naked, and, or, semi-naked images of themselves,’ ‘[j]ust over half of them went on to share the images with others’ 
(Ibid. 11). For more information on the study’s findings on sexting, see particularly 46–52 
<https://www.nspcc.org.uk/services-and-resources/research-and-resources/2016/i-wasnt-sure-it-was-normal-to-
watch-it/> accessed 30 August 2017.               
22 L Lewis, R Skinner, L Watchirs-Smith, S Cooper, J Kaldor, and R Guy, ‘A Literature Review of Sexting Attitudes 
and Risk Factors’ (2013) Vol 89 (Suppl 1) Sexually Transmitted Infections A312. This academic literature review 
covered ‘seven studies,’ ‘most were cross-sectional, all were quantitative and conducted in the United States.’    
23 Alexi Mostrous and Elizabeth Rigby, ‘Schools hit by sexting epidemic’ The Times (London 12 March 2016) 
<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/headline-here-0s8btlzlx> accessed 30 August 2017.   
24 Michael Savage, ‘Police investigate seven-year-olds in sexting epidemic’ The Times (London 12 April 2017) 
<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/police-investigate-seven-year-olds-in-sexting-epidemic-px77tbg73> accessed 
30 August 2017.     
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2012 study conducted by the Institute of Education, University of London, Kings College 
London, and the London School of Economics and Political Science for the NSPCC, reported 
that ‘12% of 11-16 year olds in the UK have seen or received sexual message online.’ 25 From 
these accounts, which merely scratch the surface of this complex issue, it appears that J.G. 
Ballard’s premonition regarding sexual activity was correct:  
 
Sexual intercourse can no longer be regarded as a personal and isolated activity, but is seen to be a 
vector in a public complex involving automobile styling, politics and mass communications. 26   
 
  Emerging from these reports, and the Ballardian frontier of networked sexual intercourse, is a 
fear of an inextricable social ‘timebomb’ tied to sexting. 27 In September 2016, in response to 
this ‘timebomb,’ the UK Council for Child Internet Safety (UKCCIS), The Department for 
Education, and the NSPCC, issued updated joint-guidance for schools and educational 
establishments on how to deal with adolescent sexting. Of key concern was the clear message 
that ‘[m]aking, possessing and distributing any imagery of someone under 18 which is 
“indecent” is illegal. This includes imagery of yourself if you are under 18.’ 28 
 
Sexting and the law. 
 
                                                          
25 Jessica Ringrose, Rosalind Gill, Sonia Livingstone, and Laura Harvey, ‘A Qualitative Study of Children, Young 
People, and “Sexting”: A report prepared for the NSPCC’ (2012), 11. <https://www.nspcc.org.uk/services-and-
resources/research-and-resources/pre-2013/qualitative-study-sexting/> accessed 30 August 2017. This figure drew 
on ‘The EU Kids Online’ project, which conducted ‘in home interviews with a nationally representative sample of 
UK children, asking about “sexting,” as part of a larger 25 country study.’ See Sonia Livingstone and Leslie 
Haddon, ‘EU Kids Online: Final report’ (2009) <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/24372/> accessed 30 August 2017.  
26 J.G. Ballard, The Atrocity Exhibition (Fourth Estate/HarperCollins, 2006), 148.   
27 Elizabeth Rigby, ‘Teenagers’ sexting out of control, say Labour’ The Times (London 22 March 2016) 
<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/teenagers-sexting-out-of-control-says-labour-qn90hv0rm> accessed 30 August 
2017. Ms. Powell, Labour’s Shadow Education Secretary, stated: ‘It's hard to shake the feeling that this is all storing 
up trouble for young people - a ticking timebomb of issue after issue that the next generation have to try to navigate 
unsupported and on their own.’ 
28 UK Council for Child Internet Safety (UKCCIS), ‘Sexting in schools and colleges: Responding to incidents and 
safeguarding young people,’ page 7. (2016) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/551575/6.2439_KG_NCA_Sexting_
in_Schools_WEB__1_.PDF> accessed 30 August 2017. 
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  The law surrounding sexting has been commented upon widely: the illegality of the act has 
received attention from the mainstream press, 29 children’s charities, 30 and legal scholarship. 31 
As per the full explanation in the UKCCIS guidance:    
 
Much of the complexity in responding to youth produced sexual imagery is due to its legal status. 
Making, possessing and distributing any imagery of someone under 18 which is ‘indecent’ is 
illegal. This includes imagery of yourself if you are under 18. The relevant legislation is contained 
in the Protection of Children Act 1978 (England and Wales) as amended in the Sexual Offences 
Act 2003 (England and Wales).  
 
Specifically:  
• It is an offence to possess, distribute, show and make indecent images of children.  
• The Sexual Offences Act 2003 (England and Wales) defines a child, for the purposes of indecent 
images, as anyone under the age of 18. 32  
 
  As noted, the law of England and Wales prohibits the dissemination of indecent images of 
anyone under the age of 18, including the voluntary dissemination of self-generated images by 
the subject of the image. As commented by Alisdair Gillespie, this is because the SOA 2003 s.45 
amended prior legislation and defined ‘a child’ as anyone under the age of 18: 33 ‘The principal 
change to the existing law is that s.45 of the SOA alters the definition of “a child” under s.1 of 
                                                          
29 As examples, see Damien Gayle, ‘Sexting could see teenagers branded as sex offenders’ The Guardian (London 4 
May 2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/may/04/sexting-teenagers-selfie-criminal-record-sex-
offenders-register> accessed 30 August 2017; Nadi Khomami, ‘Boy, 14, added to police database after sexting 
female classmate naked image’ The Guardian (London 3 September 2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2015/sep/03/boy-14-added-to-police-database-after-sexting-female-classmate> accessed 30 August 2017.  
30 See the NSPCC’s <https://www.nspcc.org.uk/preventing-abuse/keeping-children-safe/sexting/> and Childline’s 
<https://www.childline.org.uk/info-advice/bullying-abuse-safety/online-mobile-safety/sexting/> public guidance on 
the legal ramifications on sexting. Accessed 30 August 2017.  
31 See four works by Alisdair Gillespie: ‘The Sexual Offences Act 2003: (3) Tinkering with “child pornography”’ 
(2004) May Crim LR 361; ‘Indecent Images of Children: The Ever-Changing Law’ (2005) 14 Child Abuse Review 
430; ‘Adolescents accessing indecent images of children’ (2008) Journal of Sexual Aggression 14(2) 111; and 
‘Adolescents, Sexting and Human Rights’ (2013) 13:4 Human Rights Law Review 623. 
32 UKCCIS (n 28), 7.  
33 As per the Government’s ‘Explanatory Notes’ for this piece of legislation, ‘[t]his clause redefines a ‘child’ for the 
purposes of the Protection of Children Act 1978 (‘the 1978 Act’) as a person under 18 years, rather than under 16 
years, of age. This change means the offences under that Act of taking, making, permitting to take, distributing, 
showing, possessing with intent to distribute, and advertising indecent photographs or pseudo-photographs of 
children will now also be applicable where the photographs concerned are of children of 16 or 17 years of age.’ 
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the Protection of Children Act 1978 (“PoCA”) and s.160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 
(“CJA”) from 16 to 18 (see s.45(1)).’ 34 
  
  The situation arising from this amendment has drawn commentary for several reasons. 35 One 
reason is the somewhat paradoxical role that the age of majority now plays within the law. As 
Gillespie notes ‘[i]n England and Wales the age of consent for sexual acts is 16 but this 
amendment ensures that whilst a 16-year-old can choose to undertake a sexual act, they cannot 
choose to be the subject of a pornographic photograph’; ‘If, as noted above, a child can legally 
partake in sexual activities, how can photographs of them be considered indecent?’ 36 Another 
reason for comment is the severity of the sanction which relates to this criminal act, whereby 
those who commit it ‘are liable for a sentence of up to 10 years’ imprisonment and [would] 
become a registered sex offender with all the repercussions that this brings.’ 37 A further reason 
for comment is the stance taken by authorities seeking to avoid prosecuting adolescents who fall 
foul of this – what could be argued to be illogical 38 – law. The illogicality of the law stems from 
its drafting without any consideration for the ‘mass adoption of the internet, mobiles and digital 
photography’ 39 and anachronistic enforcement in an age when these technologies were 
                                                          
34 Gillespie (n 31, 2004), 361–362. See also, at 361, Gillespie’s explanation of the amendment’s implementation due 
to ‘international obligations,’ most likely referring to the European Framework decision [2001] O.J. C26E. 
35 See Nicola Henry and Anastasia Powell, ‘Sexual Violence in the Digital Age: The Scope and Limits of Criminal 
Law’ (2016) Social & Legal Studies 25(4) 397, at 400–405 and Shaheen Shariff, Sexting and Cyberbullying: 
Defining the Line for Digitally Empowered Kids (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 36–98.    
36 Gillespie (n 31, 2004), 362. See also his further analysis of this paradox at 363: ‘However, if society is willing to 
accept that children aged over 16 are able to have sexual intercourse, will they find that a picture of a 17-year-old 
either nude or in a sexual pose is indecent?’ See also Shariff (n 35), 76: ‘[I]t is also important to point out that we are 
headed down the wrong path if we charge kids with child pornography offenses. And it is essential to emphasize 
that children are not child pornographers!’      
37 Gillespie (n 31, 2004), 364.  
38 Authorities in England and Wales have repeatedly stated their reluctance to prosecute adolescents involved in 
sexting. See the Crown Prosecution Service’s April 2016 ‘Guidelines on Prosecuting Cases of Child Sexual Abuse,’ 
paras. 79 and 80: ‘However, care should be taken when considering any cases of ‘sexting’ that involve images taken 
of persons under 18’ … ‘Whilst it would not usually be in the public interest to prosecute the consensual sharing of 
an image between two children of a similar age in a relationship, a prosecution may be appropriate in other 
scenarios.’ The guidance then refers to the NSPCC guidance mentioned at (n 32).  
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/child_sexual_abuse/> accessed 30 August 2017. The Crown Prosecution 
Service has also produced legal guidance relating to ‘Indecent Images of Children,’ although this document does not 
refer to sexting. See also, with regard to the decision of The National Police Chiefs Council to not actively pursue 
prosecutions, Karen McVeigh, ‘Police chiefs draw up sexting guidance for schools’ The Guardian (London June 14 
2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/jun/14/police-chiefs-sexting-guidance-schools> accessed 30 
August 2017.      
39 UKCCIS (n 28), 8.  
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commonplace. Two legal sources have commented on the law’s illogicality, the first being the 
Chairman of the Criminal Bar Association, Mark Fenhalls QC:    
 
Politicians must ensure that laws are logical and consistent. If they do not, the law will be 
considered an ass and public confidence in the rule of law will be damaged. It is legal for 16-year-
olds to have sex with each other and yet illegal for 17-year-olds to take and keep naked pictures of 
each other. This makes no sense. This area of criminal law requires urgent review and reform. 40 
 
  Fenhalls comments that if the law permits 16-year olds to engage in sexual intercourse with 
each other, then ‘it makes no sense’ that the law would simultaneously prohibit 17-year olds, or 
indeed 16-year olds, from taking and keeping naked images of each other. Similarly, the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) is also clearly aware of the law’s illogicality. In October 2016 the 
CPS released new guidance for the prosecution of offences, such as sexting, which have been 
committed ‘by the sending of a communication via social media.’ 41 With respect to sexting, the 
CPS has noted that ‘care should be taken when considering any cases of “sexting” that involve 
images taken of persons under 18,’ explaining that ‘it would not usually be in the public interest 
to prosecute the consensual sharing of an image between two children of a similar age in a 
relationship.’ 42 Consequently, despite it being an illegal act when images of those below 18 
years of age are created, stored, and distributed consensually by adolescents, the CPS has 
publicly stated that there is no public interest in prosecution. 
 
‘Revenge pornography.’ 
 
  However, the matter is entirely different if the image is shared without the consent of the 
subject involved. ‘Revenge pornography’ is illegal as per s.33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts 
                                                          
40 See Mark Fenhalls, ‘Review “sexting” law; Letters to the Editor’ The Times (London September 5 2015) 
<http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/letters/article4547884.ece> accessed 30 August 2017.    
41 The Crown Prosecution Service: ‘Guidelines on prosecuting cases involving communications sent via social 
media’: <http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/communications_sent_via_social_media/> accessed 30 August 2017. 
Note that ‘social media’ refers to ‘the use of electronic devices to create, share or exchange information, ideas, 
pictures and videos with others via virtual communities and networks. For the purposes of these guidelines, this 
includes emails and texts and other forms of electronic communications.’ 
42 Ibid.  
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Act 2015 (CJCA 2015). 43 This act differs from sexting because whereas sexting involves 
consensual self-distribution by the subject of the image in question, revenge pornography 
involves distribution which is executed neither by the subject of the image nor with their 
consent: as per s.33 CJCA 2015, revenge pornography occurs ‘without the consent of an 
individual who appears in the photograph’ 44 and ‘with the intention of causing that individual 
distress.’ 45 As noted in the government’s commentary, outlawing revenge pornography aimed to 
protect individuals from actions done to them without their consent: ‘This amendment, although 
it applies both online and offline, reflects the government’s ongoing commitment to protecting 
people from bullying, exploitation and harassment on the internet.’ 46 Here, the law’s approach 
to the distribution of sexually explicit material is antithetical to the approach involving sexting 
because the law relating to revenge pornography was implemented with due attention paid to the 
cultural and technological context of the day. The legislation specifically aimed to ‘target the 
growing issues caused by the technological advances’ which could lead to ‘the sending of 
sexually explicit content, primarily via mobile technology.’ 47 From the origins of this law – as 
an amendment to the CJCA 2015 from the Lords – it is evident that its implementation followed 
a conscious account of the technology enabling revenge pornography: mobile, camera-wielding, 
internet-connected, smartphones: 
 
My Lords, the term “revenge pornography” refers to the publication, usually but not always, on the 
internet, of intimate images of former lovers without their consent. … Obtaining such images has 
become more common and much easier with the prevalence, popularity and sophistication of 
smartphones, with their ability to take or record high quality images, still and video, instantly and 
simply, with accompanying sound in the case of video. It is set to become even easier to take such 
                                                          
43 See Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 s 33, which came into force 13 April 2015:  
‘Disclosing private sexual photographs and films with intent to cause distress.’ 
(1) It is an offence for a person to disclose a private sexual photograph or film if the disclosure is made- 
(a) without the consent of an individual who appears in the photograph or film, and 
(b) with the intention of causing that individual distress. 
44 See Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 s 33(1)(a). Emphasis added.  
45 See Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 s 33(1)(b). Emphasis added.  
46 See ‘Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015: Overarching Impact Assessment’: 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/441655/overarching-enactment.pdf> 
accessed 30 August 2017.   
47 Andy Phippen and Jennifer Agate, ‘New social media offences under the Criminal Justice and Courts Act and 
Serious Crime Act: the cultural context’ (2015) Entertainment Law Review 26(3) 82, at 82. See also, at 84: 
‘[s]exting as a cultural phenomenon is very much in the public eye and a precursor to the attention paid to revenge 
porn.’ 
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images with the advent of cameras installed in glasses and yet further improvement in high 
definition video cameras in phones. 48 
 
  This 21st century law on sexual relations is a ‘well thought out, effectively debated statute,’ 49 
which addresses a pressing issue of the day. 50 However, the current prohibition of consensual 
adolescent sexting cannot be described in the same way because this anachronous law was not 
implemented with the requisite attention paid to the technological context of the day. 51  
 
  In order to engage with this illogical law the legal analysis offered in this article concentrates on 
the sole causal reason behind the spike in the occurrence of sexting: the incredible proliferation 
of internet-connected mobile smartphones equipped with powerful digital cameras. This 
approach aims to avoid repeating the mistake made during the legislative process, where not 
enough requisite forethought was given to this technological development which was unfurling 
simultaneously to the legal drafting. 52 In early 2003, months prior to the legislation’s 
finalisation, mainstream news was reporting that the exponential growth of camera-equipped 
smartphones was already changing society’s understanding of digital images: ‘All camera 
phones allow images to be instantly sent to other phones, copied to a website or e-mailed to 
others.’ 53 Thus, it was already becoming apparent that ‘camera phone owners are showing off 
indiscreet pictures taken without the subject’s knowledge.’ 54 Yet, when drafting the SOA 2003 
to govern sexual relations in the 21st century, the legislature failed to make it representative of its 
time and place. The requirement for the law to be adaptive to societal change is absolutely 
                                                          
48 Taken from the Daily Hansard transcript of the House of Lords Committee: 2nd sitting for the Criminal Justice and 
Courts Act 2015 – House of Lords 21st July 2014: Column 969, as per Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames. 
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldhansrd/text/140721-0002.htm> accessed 30 August 2017.    
49 Phippen and Agate (n 47), 84. 
50 However, the crime of revenge pornography was prosecutable under various pre-existing pieces of legislation: 
‘namely the Obscene Publications Act 1959, the Malicious Communications Act 1988, the Communications Act 
2003 s 127 (limitation period extended to 3 years) and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.’ See Alec Samuels 
‘The Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015’ (2015) Criminal Lawyer 225 2, at 4.  
51 Consequently, on this point, this author does not agree with the following comment from Phippen and Agate (n 
47), 84): ‘With the older laws [referring to the SOA 2003], further complexity resides in the fact that the laws were 
put into place in a time before the phenomenon of self generation was technologically possible.’ 
52 See SC Deb (B) 18 September 2003, cols 247–258. 
53 See –– ‘Furtive phone photography spurs ban’ BBC News (4 April 2003) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/2916353.stm> accessed 30 August 2017. 
54 See –– ‘Phone users become picture savvy’ BBC News (12 February 2003) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2752113.stm> accessed 30 August 2017.  
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crucial for its adequate existence in the world. As Peter Fitzpatrick has argued: ‘Law cannot be 
purely fixed and pre-existent if it is to change and adapt to society, as it is so often said that it 
must.’ 55 And he notes further, if law does not do ‘everything,’ if law is not ‘ever responsive to 
change,’ then ‘law will eventually cease to rule the situation which has changed around it.’ 56 It 
seems that it may now be the case that because it did not adapt in a responsive manner to the 
technological changes occurring around it, the law governing sexting has now ceased to 
adequately rule the 21st century world it finds itself in.  
 
  To avoid repeating the mistake of the legislature, this piece aims to contribute to our 
understanding of sexting by locating it within its unique social context. For today, nearly a 
decade and a half after the coming into force of the law, Ofcom’s 2016 ‘Communications Market 
Report’ states that 90% of UK 16–24 year olds and 91% of UK 25–34 year olds own a 
smartphone: 57 the smartphone is truly ubiquitous. The explosion in this technology has now 
ensured that the mobile, near-instantaneous, creation and dissemination of digital content across 
borders and oceans via the internet is a completely banal act of the third millennium. 58 Yet, due 
to the law’s inability to comprehend this era, sexting remains incompetently accounted for. With 
this problematic made clear, the next section of this article moves to conduct an investigation 
into the significance and philosophical resonance of the mobile phone, the ‘formidable tool for 
constructing social reality.’ 59       
 
                                                          
55 Peter Fitzpatrick, Modernism and the Grounds of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 71.   
56 Ibid.  
57 Ofcom, ‘The Communications Market Report’ (4th August 2016) 190: ‘Adults under 55 were more likely to own a 
smartphone in 2016, compared to the UK overall. The difference in the ownership of smartphones between younger 
and older age groups is stark: twice as many 16–24s and 25–34s owned a smartphone (90% and 91% respectively) 
than over-55s (42%). Over-55s were less likely than adults in the UK overall to own a smartphone (42% vs. 71%).’ 
For the methodological explanation behind Ofcom’s data see, Ibid. 2. 
<http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/cmr/cmr16/uk/CMR_UK_2016.pdf> accessed 30 August 2017. 
See also Deloitte, ‘There’s no place like phone: Consumer usage patterns in the era of peak smartphone (Global 
Mobile Consumer Survey 2016: UK Cut)’ (2016) 4: ‘In a mere nine years the smartphone has had a massive impact 
on UK society. Collectively, UK citizens look at their smartphones over a billion times a day. Four out of five adults 
now have one. Among 18–44 year olds, adoption is higher still at 91 per cent – equivalent to 21 million people.’ 
This data collection was ‘based on a nationally representative sample of 4,000 UK consumers aged 18–75. The 
sample follows a country specific quota on age, gender, region, working and socio-economic status.’ 
<http://www.deloitte.co.uk/mobileuk/assets/pdf/Deloitte-Mobile-Consumer-2016-There-is-no-place-like-phone.pdf> 
accessed 30 August 2017. 
58 This essentially completes the vision of Web 2.0, first conceived in 1999. This will be referred to below. For the 
origin of this concept, see Darcy DiNucci, ‘Fragmented Future’ (1999) Print Magazine April 1999.    
59 Ferraris (n 7), 6.  
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3. Deconstruction and Digital Technology.  
 
  In order to examine the mobile phone’s philosophical significance, it is first necessary to 
explain this article’s methodology. Accordingly, the next two sections of this article are related 
explanatory sections. The first part explains the work of Jacques Derrida, firstly in general and 
then with regards to digital technology. The second part then moves to explain Ferraris’ 
Derridean philosophy and its application to the mobile phone via his seminal book Where Are 
You? An Ontology of the Cell Phone.    
 
Jacques Derrida: an introduction.       
 
  Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) is most well-known for his philosophical theory of 
‘deconstruction’ and its ground-breaking effect on the humanities. 60 His work involved a radical 
rethinking of writing, in which he argued that Western philosophy had incorrectly viewed 
writing as ‘a secondary and instrumental function,’ or a ‘translator’ of ‘speech that was fully 
present.’ 61 In retort, Derrida posited an ‘enlarged and radicalized’ 62 account which more 
accurately represented the technology, or techné, 63 of writing in the late 20th century: this was 
the argument in his 1967 book De la Grammatologie, 64 published in English as Of 
Grammatology in 1976. Therein Derrida argued that our modern ‘enlarged’ understanding of 
writing refers to ‘all that gives rise to an inscription in general.’ 65 This meant that writing 
                                                          
60 For commentary on Derrida’s influence on the humanities see Tom Cohen (ed), Jacques Derrida and the 
Humanities: A Critical Reader (Cambridge University Press, 2001), Mary Caputi and Vincent J. Del Casino, Jr 
(eds), Derrida and the Future of the Liberal Arts: Professions of Faith (Bloomsbury, 2013), and Michael Peters and 
Peter Trifonas (eds), Deconstructing Derrida: Tasks for the New Humanities (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). For a 
tribute to Derrida’s life and works see Costas Douzinas (ed), Adieu Derrida (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). Citations 
to Derrida’s work run into hundreds of thousands and can be viewed using Google Scholar’s algorithm programme: 
<https://scholar.google.co.uk/citations?user=0A_lO2UAAAAJ> accessed 30 August 2017.     
61 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak tr, John Hopkins University Press, 1976), 8. For 
such an account of writing, see Plato, ‘Phaedrus’ in Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (eds) Plato: The 
Collected Dialogues including the Letters (Princeton University Press, 1961).    
62 Derrida (n 61), 10.   
63 Techné refers to the process of ‘the revealing that brings forth truth into the splendour of radiant appearance.’ See 
Martin Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ in David Farrell Krell (ed) Martin Heidegger: Basic 
Writings – Revised and Expanded Edition (David Farrell Krell tr, Routledge, 1993), 339. See also 319: ‘Thus what 
is decisive in techné does not at all lie in making and manipulating, nor in the using of means, but rather in the 
revealing mentioned before. It is as revealing, and not as manufacturing, that techné is a bringing-forth.’          
64 Jacques Derrida, De la Grammatologie (Les Editions de Minuit, 1967).  
65 Derrida (n 61), 9.  
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encompasses ‘not only the physical gestures of literal pictographic or ideographic inscription, but 
also the totality of what makes it possible.’ 66 In short, the technology of writing is, and 
encompasses, any process which produces inscriptions; inscriptions are marks ‘on a physical 
substrate whatsoever, from marble to neurons, passing through paper and computers,’ 67 which 
allow for entities to survive the passing of time. ‘[C]inematography,’ ‘choreography,’ and 
‘pictorial, musical, [and] sculptural “writing”’ are all examples of writing because they produce 
inscriptions which survive the passing of time. 68 Further examples include inscriptions ‘found 
on a piece of paper or in a computer file’ 69 or what a biologist may refer to as the ‘writing and 
pro-gram’ found in ‘the most elementary processes of information within the living cell.’ 70 
Derrida argued that this understanding of writing accounted for the existence of all entities from 
the ‘“non-living” up to “consciousness,” passing through all levels of animal organization.’ 71 
Finally, he used the term ‘texts’ to refer to all the grounds and planes of existence which contain 
written inscriptions: a text is a ‘fabric of signs.’ 72 This led to, perhaps, Derrida’s most famous 
philosophical maxim: ‘There is nothing outside of the text [there is no outside-text; il n’y a pas 
de hors-texte].’ 73 This maxim asserts that because a ‘transcendental signifier’ 74 does not exist, 
that is a phenomenon existing without reference to another signifier, the consequence is that 
inscriptions only ever refer to other inscriptions, within ‘texts,’ in an infinite cycle of reference. 
This is Derrida’s critique of metaphysics: ‘the process of signification which orders the 
displacement and substitutions for this law of central presence.’ 75 In summary, Derrida argued 
                                                          
66 Ibid.  
67 Maurizio Ferraris, ‘Social Ontology and Documentality’ in Giovanni Sartor, Pompeu Casanovas, Maria Angela 
Biasiotti, and Meritxell Fernández-Barrera (eds) Approaches to Legal Ontologies: Theories, Domains, 
Methodologies (Springer Dordrecht, 2011), 91.     
68 Derrida (n 61), 47. See also Ferraris (n 17), 176: ‘The cinema, which is strangely opposed to the book, is a 
registered and repeatable object, essentially like writing, and these days is often recorded on the same media used 
for writing.’  
69 Maurizio Ferraris, ‘Documentality, or Europe’ (2009) Vol.92(2) The Monist: An International Quarterly Journal 
of General Philosophical Inquiry 286, at 295. 
70 Derrida (n 61), 9. See also Ferraris (n 67), 91: ‘I do not consider obnoxious the idea that also brain processes are 
to be described in terms of a sort of writing, since they manifest to us exactly in those terms, as it is revealed also by 
the fact that the mind has always been described as a tabula rasa, i.e. a writing table.’    
71 Derrida (n 61), 47.  
72 Ibid. 14. See also 65.   
73 Ibid. 158.   
74 See Jacques Derrida, ‘Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,’ in Jacques Derrida, 
Writing and Difference (Alan Bass tr, Routledge, 2001), 354: ‘The absence of the transcendental signified extends 
the domain and the play of signification infinitely.’  
75 Ibid. 353.  
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that the technology of writing is unsurpassed because it produces the inscriptions which allow 
entities to survive the passing of time, whilst housed within unlimited fields of referentiality.          
 
  The later years of Derrida’s work saw him explicitly address the developing digital 
technologies of the late 20th century, including multimedia consumer electronics, email, and the 
internet. But given his death in 2004, he did not experience the ubiquity of high-end laptops, 
smartphones, and high-speed mobile internet connections. Consequently, his work on this 
dawning era of this technology consisted of proto-philosophical musings regarding how ‘writing’ 
would be taken up in the digital era: 76 ‘we still need inscriptions, and no one, apart from 
Derrida, realised this.’ 77 Yet, little could Derrida have known that the mobile phone would soon 
house all the technological advances he witnessed and much more. And during this period, in an 
almost uncanny anticipation of the future, Maurizio Ferraris was heavily involved in Derrida’s 
work, thought, and writing. The following section outlines some of Derrida’s key reflections on 
digital technology and thereafter moves to elucidate Ferraris’ own work on the mobile phone.  
 
The mid-1990s: deconstruction and digital technology.    
 
  Turning to Derrida’s deconstructive engagement with ‘digital writing’ technologies, the 
following section explains what it means to ‘write’ in a digital world and how this causes legal 
difficulties surrounding sexting. This section briefly covers four points of engagement from 
Derrida’s work: content creation (‘Web 2.0’), email, digital as compared to analogue writing, 
and the law’s engagement with technology.  
 
Web 2.0 and content creation.  
 
                                                          
76 Note that Derrida’s philosophy did have a significant impact on early media theory. See particularly the following 
work which was originally written in 1985: Friedrich Kittler, Discourse Networks, 1800/1900 (Michael Metteer with 
Chris Cullens trs, Stanford University Press, 1990).    
77 Ferraris (n 7), 112.  
16 
 
  In 1993 Derrida’s thoughts on the philosophy of writing led him to posit that developing digital 
mediums, such as multimedia devices and the internet, would soon allow the ‘electronic larger 
public’ to write digital content for themselves: 78  
 
The technical development to which you allude confirms it … You will be less and less able to 
convince citizens that they should be content with national production once they have access to a 
global production from the outset by themselves. 79 
 
  Derrida’s claim was significant for two reasons. Firstly because he foresaw, six years ahead of 
its mainstream realisation, what Darcy DiNucci would (in 1999) call ‘Web 2.0.’ 80 This term 
refers to the development of the internet from a platform of ‘typical brochure-like displays of 
Times or Arial text’ 81 to a platform akin to a ‘transport mechanism, the ether through which 
interactivity happens.’ 82 This version of the internet would host and connect multimedia to a 
multitude of devices, from ‘TV sets’ to ‘car dashboard[s],’ and from ‘hand-held game machines’ 
to ‘cell phone[s],’ 83 and perhaps most crucially it would ‘also open the market to third-party 
publishers – leading to a profusion of content that would in turn sell more [mobile] phones.’ 84 
This leads to the second significance of Derrida’s claim because he noted that this transformation 
would radically affect what was recognised as ‘the market,’ and the ‘consumers’ and 
‘addressees’ in it. 85 The public’s ability to produce their own content, as third-party publishers, 
would transform the idea of a ‘consumer’ in the market because everyone would be able to 
produce their own content: ‘[i]t is precisely the concept of the addressee that would have to be 
                                                          
78 Jacques Derrida and Bernard Stiegler, Echographies of Television: Filmed Interviews (Jennifer Bajorek tr, Polity 
Press, 2002), 53.   
79 Ibid. 
80 DiNucci (n 58), 32: ‘The first glimmerings of Web 2.0 are beginning to appear, and we are just starting to see how 
that embryo might develop. … The Web will be understood not as screenfuls of text and graphics but as a transport 
mechanism, the ether through which interactivity happens. It will still appear on your computer screen, transformed 
by video and other dynamic media made possible by the speedy connection technologies now coming down the 
pike. The Web will also appear, in different guises, on your TV set (interactive content woven seamlessly into 
programming and commercials), your car dashboard (maps, Yellow Pages, and other traveller info), your cell phone 
(news, stock quotes, flight updates), hand-held game machines (linking players with competitors over the Net), and 
maybe even your microwave (automatically finding cooking times for products).’    
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid.   
84 Ibid. 222 
85 Derrida and Stiegler (n 78), 53–55.  
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transformed.’ 86 Said differently, Derrida commented that ‘those who were previously in the 
position of consumer-spectators can intervene in the market.’ 87 And now, with twenty-five 
years’ worth of hindsight, Derrida’s prediction has been proved correct as the ubiquitous ability 
to instantly create, disseminate, and consume digital media has revolutionised the world. It was 
this liminal moment in the development of the internet and multimedia devices, most of all the 
mobile phone, which provided the bedrock for the sexting epidemic. 88  
 
  Lastly, Philip Armstrong has commented that Derrida’s work also enabled conceptualisations of 
digital subjectivity, such as ‘netizens, cybercitizens, or virtual communities,’ as well as 
‘cyberculture and cyberpolitics.’ 89 And sexting now finds itself embroiled in questions of both 
digital subjectivity and cyberpolitics because if this act is – as has been argued – ‘merely an 
expression of teen sexuality in a digital age,’ 90 then the abilities afforded by content creation, 
mass instant communications, and the privacy of mobile phones, have irreparably transformed 
adolescent sexuality into a ‘digital sexuality’ of the third millennium which needs to be 
accounted for in law. 91 
  
Email: ‘dromology.’ 
 
  By 1996 Derrida was prioritising email over all other technological developments because its 
communication of digital written text was nearly instantaneous. He opined that ‘even more than 
                                                          
86 Derrida and Stiegler (n 78), 55.   
87 Ibid. 54.  
88 Frances Perraudin, ‘Boy of five among nearly 400 sexting cases dealt with by police’ The Guardian (12 July 
2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/jul/12/sexting-boy-five-400-police-children-explicit-pictures> 
accessed 30 August 2017. This article reports that a 10 year-old boy used an application (an ‘app’) called ‘Oovoo’ to 
send an explicit image. ‘Oovoo’ describes itself as follows: ‘We’re a global social media platform for connecting 
with friends and family via high quality video chat, video messaging and rich, collaborative video stories.’ See 
<https://www.oovoo.com/about.html> accessed 30 August 2017. 
89 Philip Armstrong, Reticulations: Jean-Luc Nancy and the Networks of the Political (University of Minnesota 
Press, 2009), 76. 
90 Eraker (n 1), 563. 
91 Armstrong (n 89), 78: ‘When and wherever a television is switched on, when and wherever a phone call is made, 
when and wherever an Internet connection is established, the question of “critical culture, of democracy, of the 
political, of deterritorialization erupts”, whether this situation also implies the relatively simple procedures of using 
a mobile phone, going online, or analyzing how the techno-artistic production of film and television now possesses 
the ability, unprecedented in the history of humanity, to find itself almost immediately plugged into a global 
market.’ The quote in Armstrong’s passage is taken from Derrida and Stiegler (n 78), 65.      
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the fax, [email] is on the way to transforming the entire public and private space of humanity.’ 92 
Email’s importance lay in its ‘unprecedented rhythm’ and ‘quasi-instantaneous’ delivery of 
information, 93 which we now see as the lynch-pin of sexting. Whereas the prior generations of 
adolescents ‘who took provocative self-portraits faced the hurdle of developing the film at a 
photo lab, and distribution was limited by the numbers of copies purchased,’ 94 in today’s digital 
world ‘camera phones and broadband connections enable instantaneous production and 
distribution’ of the very same provocative self-portraits. 95 
 
  The study of speed, ‘dromology,’ had been at the core of French theorist Paul Virilio’s work 
since the late-1970s. 96 In 1977 Virilio stated: ‘Western man has appeared superior and 
dominant, despite inferior demographics, because he appeared more rapid.’ 97 And in 1998, 98 
four years after Derrida’s comments on email, Virilio commented that email represented the 
development of a ‘cyber-acceleration’ 99 leading to ‘the instantaneity of the real-time image.’ 100 
In Derrida’s work on the revolutionary capabilities of email, he sought to convey the ‘geo-
techno-logical shocks’ which would have been felt by previous generations if they ‘had had 
access to … computers, printers, faxes, televisions, teleconferences, and above all E-mail.’ 101 
Such ‘geo-techno-logical-shock[s]’ relating to the speed and instantaneity of sexting are partly 
responsible for the contemporary problems in legislating for this act but such difficulties caused 
by the instant communications of mobile phones need to be recognised and accounted for, not 
ignored, as Derrida illustrated.     
   
                                                          
92 Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression (Eric Prenowitz tr, The University of Chicago Press, 
1996), 17.    
93 Ibid. See also Carsten Strathausen, ‘The Philosopher’s Body: Derrida and Teletechnology’ (2009) CR: The New 
Centennial Review 9(2) 139, at 145: ‘In other words, what separates writing from teletechnologies is the latter’s 
unprecedented speed of recording, distributing, and reconstituting images and other information. It is a quantitative 
difference: electronic media move too fast.’      
94 Eraker (n 1), 563.  
95 Ibid.  
96 See Paul Virilio, Vitesse et Politique (Édition Galilée, 1977). English translation: Paul Virilio, Speed and Politics: 
An Essay on Dromology (Mark Polizzotti tr, Semioext(e), 2006).   
97 Virilio (n 100, 2006), 70.   
98 Paul Virilio, La Bombe informatique (Édition Galilée, 1998).   
99 Paul Virilio, The Information Bomb (Chris Turner tr, Verso, 2000), 120. 
100 Ibid. 72.   
101 Derrida (n 92), 16.    
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Digital and analogue writing. 
  
  Derrida’s engagement with digital writing also focused on some of the technologies shaping 
writing’s future, including home computers and the writing programmes featured on them. 102 
Derrida engaged with the thought of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger regarding the 
‘authenticity’ of writing produced by methods beyond the hand and the pen. Heidegger’s 
renowned pessimism for technology was not shared by Derrida 103 but Heidegger’s work offers 
an interesting point of note regarding sexting. Heidegger argued that a type of pragmatism 
associated with the hand – from the Greek word ‘πράγμα’ 104 – would be lost due to 
technological advances. Significantly, his famous case-study for this point focused on the 
difference between writing by hand and writing via a typewriter:    
 
The typewriter veils the essence of writing and of the script. It withdraws from man the essential 
rank of the hand, without man’s experiencing this withdrawal appropriately and recognizing that is 
has transformed the relation of his Being to his essence. 105   
 
  Heidegger argued that ‘inauthentic’ technology wrought the decline of pragmatism, or 
‘Handlung’ in German, in which ‘thing and activity are thought in the unity of a Handeln 
governed by the essence of the hand.’ 106 He commented: ‘The essence of modern technology 
lies in enframing. Enframing belongs within the destining of revealing … The destining of 
                                                          
102 See Jacques Derrida, ‘The Word Processor’ in Jacques Derrida, Paper Machine (Rachel Bowlby tr, Stanford 
University Press, 2005), 19–32, and Jacques Derrida, ‘Paper or Me, You Know … (New Speculations on a Luxury 
of the Poor) in Jacques Derrida, Paper Machine (Rachel Bowlby tr, Stanford University Press, 2005), 41–65. See 
also Ferraris (n 17), 176–177: ‘The instrument that has made most of an impact on the world of today, the computer, 
was first thought of as a calculating apparatus and then used for registering writing; only later did it evolve, just as 
happened to the ancient scripts, into a means of communications.’   
103 Jacques Derrida, ‘Geschlecht II: Heidegger’s Hand’ in John Sallis (ed) Deconstruction and Philosophy: The 
Texts of Jacques Derrida (University of Chicago Press, 1987), 172. Here Derrida remarks that Heidegger’s thought 
operates as a failed ‘artisanalist protest against the hand’s effacement or debasement in the industrial automation of 
modern mechanization.’ And see at 173, where Derrida labels Heidegger’s account of the hand as ‘seriously 
dogmatic’ because ‘Heidegger takes no account of a certain “zoological knowledge”’ regarding the ‘animality’ he 
pejoratively casts upon those who are without hands. 
104 See Martin Heidegger, Parmenides (André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz tr, Indiana University Press, 1992), 
84: ‘We translate πράγμα as “action” [Handlung]. This word, however, does not mean human activity (actio) but the 
unitary way that at any time things are on hand and at hand, i.e., are related to the hand, and that man, in his 
comportment, i.e., in his acting by means of the hand, is posited in relation to the things.’ 
105 Ibid. 85. 
106 Christopher Fynsk, Language and Relation: …that there is language (Stanford University Press, 1996), 105.   
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revealing is in itself not just any danger, but the danger.’ 107 The dangerous technology of the 
typewriter would no doubt extend to the computer, the laptop, and certainly to the mobile phone. 
Timothy Campbell comments that Heidegger’s work on technology is ‘thanatopolitical,’ 
meaning that technology is presented as a phenomenon inextricably linked with controlling and 
driving life towards death. 108 Heidegger’s work presents a ‘deep association of improper 
writing’ with ‘a technologically rendered revelation that places mankind at risk,’ 109 and further 
his work also operates ‘in the knowledge that where technology is augmented, (human) beings 
can be dominated.’ 110  
 
  One wagers that Heidegger would view that the aforementioned sexting ‘timebomb’ is due the 
damaging prevalence of the mobile phone in today’s world. 111 And perhaps Heidegger’s most 
relevant account of the damage being done comes from his warning of technology’s ability to 
‘captivate,’ ‘bewitch,’ and ‘dazzle’ to the point where it ‘come[s] to be accepted and practiced as 
the only way of thinking.’ 112 In our contemporary world there seems to be little beyond, or little 
which surpasses, the ubiquity, power, borderless-reach, and instantaneity of the mobile phone.  
   
Law in the digital age. 
 
  The final point to take from Derrida’s work on digital technologies concerns his thought on 
how law would inevitably have to adapt to such technologies. Beginning with a reflection on the 
1991 Rodney King police-brutality case in Los Angeles, 113 Derrida remarked that as a 
consequence of a world in which consumer electronics, email, and the internet would soon 
                                                          
107 Heidegger (n 63), 330, 331.    
108 For perhaps the most famous originary work on ‘thanatopolitics’ see Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: 
The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 (Robert Hurley tr, Penguin Books, 1998), 137: ‘entire populations are mobilized for 
the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital.’ For a recent 
application of thanatopolitics, see Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Daniel Heller-
Roazen tr, Stanford University Press, 1998).       
109 Timothy Campbell, Improper Life: Technology and Biopolitics from Heidegger to Agamben (University of 
Minnesota Press, 2011), 17. See in general 1–30.     
110 Ibid. 30.   
111 Rigby (n 27).  
112 Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking (John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund trs, Harper and Row, 1966), 
56. 
113 Derrida and Stiegler (n 78), 90: ‘In the Rodney King case, in California, it just so happened that a witness, 
equipped with a videocamera that his parents had given him, was there when police officers beat up Rodney King. 
Thus there was a live image of the event.’   
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become prevalent, legal systems would have to evolve: ‘the entire axiomatic of law or, in any 
case, of the Western law we’re talking about, clearly has to be and will have to be transformed 
and reelaborated in view of the technological mutations we’re talking about.’ 114 Although blunt, 
Derrida’s thesis was nevertheless correct: juridical systems did have to accommodate the 
technological revolutions of the digital age and the abilities they provided for legal testimony, 
evidence, and the more general practice of law. 115 Following this remark, Derrida then made a 
nuanced observation which we can transpose onto the 21st century problematic of sexting.  
 
  Derrida’s observation referred to the capabilities afforded by ‘Web 2.0.’ He stated: [N]ot only is 
all regulation in the form of state law, all cultural protection decided by a nation-state dangerous 
in itself, but it is outdated from a technical standpoint. 116 Referring to the imminent explosion of 
content creation, Derrida made it clear that law was already out of date ‘from a technical 
standpoint’ because it could not accommodate a future in which individuals created content. 
Instead, law was premised upon state-created content which was already outdated due to 
developments where, for example, ‘rock bands have appropriated what are called “samplers” for 
treating the sound archive, and a new music has appeared, produced primarily through archive 
manipulation.’ 117 With hindsight, this observation speaks volumes regarding the contemporary 
world in the third millennium in which taking a photo on a mobile phone, or posting to social 
media, is a banal and everyday common occurrence. And in the case of sexting, this development 
has not been accounted for in law and consequently, just as Derrida warned, the law is 
ludicrously outdated from a technical standpoint.          
 
Derrida, technology, deconstruction. 
 
  In summarising Derrida’s thoughts on digital technology, a few key points can be made: he 
envisioned an age in which digital writing would allow the global public, through new software 
                                                          
114 Ibid. 93.   
115 For a recent and insightful account of the how developments in digital and audio-visual mediums have impacted 
upon the juridical process see Elizabeth G. Porter, ‘Taking Images Seriously’ (2014) 114(7) Columbia Law Review 
1687, especially 1711–1740. Also, for a now famous article on how late 20th century digital technology affected law 
– published the year prior to Derrida’s interview with Stiegler – see Ronald K.L. Collins and David M. Skover, 
‘Paratexts’ (1992) 44(3) Stanford Law Review 509.         
116 Derrida and Stiegler (n 78), 53.  
117 Ibid.  
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and devices, to write and instantaneously distribute their own digital content over numerous 
social planes as ‘addressors’ instead of ‘addressees.’ 118 With hindsight, we can note the 
blistering speed with which Derrida’s vision of writing was achieved: 
 
Facebook was only founded in 2004. YouTube only started in 2005. Twitter was only launched in 
2006. Email only got going in the mid-1990s, and mobile phones only became popular around 
2000. The rich digital life that we live today only really began around the third millennium. 119  
 
  Today, as a result of the exponential growth of Web 2.0, content creation and distribution via 
the mobile phone is the writing device for a growing percentage of the global population. As 
Ferraris commented in 2005, it is plain to see ‘the huge change of the last thirty years, in which 
have witnessed an explosion in the systems of registration and of writing, from computers to 
mobile phones and the Web.’ 120 And as if by way of evidencing this, during the time of writing 
Facebook announced that it now hosts 2 billion monthly users across the globe. 121 This leads to 
Derrida’s final comment, made in 1996, on how everyday life of the future would be affected by 
‘the Web’:      
 
Think about the “addiction” of those who travel day and night in this WWW. They can no longer 
do without these world crossings, these voyages by sail, or veil, crossing or cutting through them in 
its turn. 122 
 
  In describing the ‘addiction’ felt amongst early internet users, Derrida was prophetically 
commenting on a symptom of internet usage which, in the 2010s, has become a well-known 
issue. 123 A Nielsen study in 2017 found that adults in the U.S., aged 18–34 years old, spend 
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nearly 27 hours a week connected to some form of audio-visual media: a quarter of that media, 
over 6 hours’ worth, is internet-connected social media and 78% of that social media is accessed 
via a smartphone. 124 Even J.G. Ballard, when questioned about this issue in 2003, answered that 
his girlfriend ‘lives on the internet’ 125 and that ‘I observe the Internet over [her] shoulder; I don’t 
want to get too close because it might suck me in.’ 126 The importance of describing this scale of 
internet usage, as well as the tremendous amount of content which is written into it, must be 
recognised when it is recalled, once again, that the current law on sexting does not have any 
comprehension of this medium and its significance in the 21st century.   
 
  In now moving to the work of Ferraris, it is important to contextualise this move. During the 
period of his engagement with digital technology, 1993 to 1996, Derrida was a friend of, 
interlocutor to, and writing partner with Maurizio Ferraris. This relationship culminated in a co-
written book between the two philosophers published in Italian in 1997 and translated into 
English in 2001 as A Taste for the Secret. 127 The book serves as a marker of not only Ferraris’ 
‘Derridean education,’ 128 but also the subject matter via which Ferraris became acquainted with 
deconstruction, because during the writing of the book Derrida was analysing the technologies of 
home computers, email, and the internet. It was no doubt this which then led Ferraris to 
investigate the technology, and create a philosophy, of the mobile phone.    
  
4. Maurizio Ferraris: An ontology of the mobile phone. 
 
Ferraris’ project.   
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refers to Derrida as ‘one of my great teachers.’ 
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  In 2001 Ferraris and Derrida were discussing mobile phones. Ferraris claimed they were ‘stupid 
machines,’ limited to producing ‘stupid texts,’ whilst computers were ‘intelligent,’ able to 
produce ‘intelligent essays.’ 129 But Derrida’s work from the 1990s led him to argue that soon 
‘mobile phones were going to centralize all the functions of a computer with the addition of the 
one feature that computers were lacking: being with us at all times.’ 130 Spurred on by this 
interjection 131 Ferraris wrote on mobile phones, under Derrida’s influence, and in 2005 
published the book Dove sei? Ontologia del telefonino, translated into English in 2014 as Where 
are you? An ontology of the cell phone. Ferraris’ book provides the reader with a philosophical, 
specifically ontological, account of the mobile phone: ‘ontology as the theory of objects is 
among the most ancient philosophical specialities.’ 132 This account answers the question of what 
this device ‘is’ in our contemporary lives: ‘the mobile phone becomes a great constructor of 
social reality; this is the theoretical point I wish to call to your attention to.’ 133 Ferraris’ work 
presents the mobile phone to the reader as a machine for writing, which creates our social 
ontology via a theory of ‘weak textualism.’  The following section engages with Ferraris’ book, 
to then relate his work to the contemporary act of sexting.    
 
Mobile phones: writing machines of the ‘hand.’ 
 
  Ferraris argues that understanding the mobile phone follows from knowing what it does. 
Despite hatred of the device by some, including Ferraris’ peer in Italian contemporary 
philosophy Giorgio Agamben, 134 it cannot be denied that because of what the device does it has 
                                                          
129 Ferraris (n 7), 1. 
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changed ‘the gestures and behaviours’ of its users. 135 The behaviour of mobile phone users is 
dictated by the fact that ‘the mobile phone constitutes an eminent social object, just like credit 
cards and documents.’ 136 It is the combination of a wireless telephone, the utilities found in 
‘agendas and address books, watches and alarm clocks, cameras and recorders,’ 137 and an 
entertainment device for ‘images, videos, films, [and] music.’ 138 And all these features, as well 
as the ability to instantaneously share user-generated content across borders, are housed in a 
small wireless device which concentrates its operation to our hand, as Heidegger noted was so 
important for an authentic human experience: ‘The kind of Being which equipment possesses – 
in which it manifests itself in its own right – we call “readiness-to-hand” (Zuhandenheit).’ 139 
Ferraris argues that because the mobile phone is a ‘handy and hand-sized,’ 140 ‘handy and palm-
sized,’ 141 ‘a hand-sized object,’ 142 it replaces the computer at ‘the center of everything: 
intentions and intuitions, writing and images, affects, [and] instrumental communication.’ 143 
The mobile phone is the quintessential object of the 21st century and is the ‘writing machine’ of 
our age, as the culmination of Derrida’s deconstructive analysis of digital technology. 144 And, 
more pertinently concerning sexting, it is ‘the specific features or affordances of mobile phones, 
social networking sites and other communication technologies’ which allow for the ‘creation, 
exchange, collection, ranking and display of images.’ 145   
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  In context, this quintessential device is used by adolescents ‘every second of the day’: ‘If I am 
not using it I feel a bit weird.’ 146 And their use ‘from waking up in the morning to going to sleep 
at night’ 147 is partly encouraged by the privacy the device affords, which in turn allows 
adolescents to experiment with sexualised content, such as sexting, away from prying eyes:  
 
With your Blackberry like with my phone, my parents don’t really check my phone yeah. That is 
why most people hide their stuff in their Blackberry. But on Facebook yeah like it is normal for 
your parents or you family to have Facebook, and they will check it. 148 
 
  The personal nature of the mobile phone has led to an unprecedented connection between the 
sexual lives of adolescents and the digital world: ‘[k]ids can access the technologies anywhere 
and there are so many of them.’ 149 And such privacy to conduct digital sexual relationships is 
shaping their lives at a rapid pace: ‘The prevalence of mobile internet technologies in young 
people’s lives was dramatically reshaping modes of communication, peer intimacy, and even 
romantic relationships.’ 150 But as Ferraris’ work illustrates the significance of the mobile phone 
does not end with its status as the ultimate writing machine and the bridge for digital-sexuality, 
because it also has ontological ramifications regarding the social world and ‘weak textualism.’ 
These ramifications lead to another crucial insight into why neglecting the mobile phone in 
legislating against sexting is a catastrophic error because the mobile phone writes real, 
significant, and powerful social objects into our world which must be accounted for.   
 
‘Weak textualism’: the ontology of the mobile phone.  
 
  Following the account of the mobile phone as the ultimate device, Ferraris then moves to 
illustrate its ontological significance through his own philosophy – ‘I propose a theory of 
writing’ 151 – which is influenced by, and yet critical of, Derrida’s thought. Ferraris’ ontology is 
critical of Derrida’s famous maxim ‘[t]here is nothing outside of the text,’ 152 which declared ‘the 
                                                          
146 Ibid. 26. This is the transcript of a school girl 13-14 years old taken from the interview contained in the report. 
147 Ibid.  
148 Ibid. 27. This is part of the same transcript referred to in (n 146).  
149 Shariff (n 35), 97. 
150 Ringrose, Gill, Livingstone, and Harvey (n 25), 27. 
151 Ferraris (n 7), 5.  
152 Derrida (n 61), 158.  
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nonexistence of a reality independent from our interpretations, the language we use, and the 
theories through which we refer to it.’ 153 Derrida’s declaration comes from his lack of belief in a 
‘transcendental signifier.’ 154 Yet Ferraris argues this is a ‘transcendental fallacy’ 155 on 
Derrida’s behalf because it is not the case ‘that reality, including physical objects, depend[s] on 
our conceptual schemes.’ 156 As Ferraris puts it, ‘mountains and rivers are what they are all on 
their own,’ and thus exist independently of what Derrida would call ‘texts.’ 157 Given this, 
Ferraris argued only certain types of objects in the world which are dependent on ‘texts,’ things 
he refers to as ‘social objects’: 
 
My claim, then, is that “there is nothing social outside the text” and not “there is nothing outside 
the text,” since the constitutive role of social objects is Object = Inscribed Act. 158 
 
  The claim that ‘there is nothing outside the text’ only applies, for Ferraris, when referring to 
‘social objects.’ These are but one kind of object within a range of three classifiable kinds. 159 
First there are ‘physical objects’ such as ‘mountains, chairs, tabernacles,’ ‘Mont Blanc,’ or any 
other ‘objects [which] do not depend on subjects.’ 160 These objects ‘exist in space and time, and 
are independent from subjects knowing them.’ 161 Secondly there are ‘ideal objects,’ like ‘the 
properties of a triangle,’ ‘an arithmetic operation,’ or ‘the principle of noncontradiction,’ which 
‘are discovered and not invented.’ 162 These differ from ‘physical objects’ because an ‘ideal 
object’ does not exist in space and time yet it does require the interaction of a subject ‘in the 
phase of their socialization: I discover a theorem and publish the outcome.’ 163 Thirdly and most 
importantly for Ferraris, are ‘social objects’ such as ‘a promise, a bet, a federal state, a football 
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team, or an epic poem.’ 164 These objects ‘do not exist as such in space, since their physical 
presence is limited to [an] inscription,’ 165 thus they only exist when ‘they exit from the mind of 
one person, are made manifest, and are then inscribed in the external world,’ in what Derrida 
would call a ‘text.’ 166 These ‘texts’ can consist of ‘an inscription on paper, magnetic memory, or 
a person’s mind.’ 167 And social objects, such as ‘legal writings,’ ‘ID cards,’ and ‘credit cards,’ 
are now becoming inscribed due to ‘simply blips in the computer.’ 168 Here it becomes clear why 
Ferraris’ ontology is so pertinent for sexting: the ‘sext’ is a social object: 
 
Social objects follow from the registration of acts that involve at least two persons and that are 
inscribed on any kind of physical medium, from marble to neurons, by way of paper and the world 
of the web. 169    
 
  Consequently, as a social object the sext is the only type of object for which Ferraris would 
agree with Derrida that there is ‘nothing outside of the text.’ 170 This means that even though 
Ferraris’ ‘viewpoint derives directly from Derrida’s philosophy,’ which itself ‘offers the basis for 
a very powerful social otology,’ 171 there are nevertheless key ‘corrections’ which Ferraris makes 
to Derrida’s work. For example: ‘In short, triangles exist even without an inscription, but 
contracts do not, and Derrida confused triangles with contracts.’ 172  
 
  Ferraris’ theory is named ‘weak textualism’: it accounts for the process through which ‘social 
objects are constructed by idiomatic inscriptions’ and then exist thereafter within ‘texts.’ 173 This 
theory is a ‘weakening of Derrida’s thesis’ because it reduces ‘[t]here is nothing outside of the 
text’ into ‘there is nothing social outside the text.’ 174 Weak textualism provides the social 
ontology in Ferraris’ work, ‘allow[ing] him to understand, and make us understand, mobile 
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phones,’ 175 because it explains that through the writing which they enable, there is a ‘world in 
which the mobile phone exists but which, rather paradoxically, seems also to exist in the mobile 
phone.’ 176 As Harcourt comments:   
 
For many of us, our digital existence has become our life – the pulse, the bloodstream, the current 
of our daily routines. For adolescents and young adults especially, it is practically impossible to 
have a social life, to have friends, to meet up, to go on dates, unless we are negotiating the various 
forms of social media and mobile technology. 177  
 
  Here it becomes even clearer how and why Ferraris’ work vividly resonates with act of sexting. 
The mobile phone dominates in creating a very particular type of philosophical object and a 
world thereafter, in which sexting resides. Said differently, if the mobile phone is ‘an absolute 
object precisely in that it is, so to speak, a mouse that needs no computer,’ 178 then it is the 
culmination of all digital writing technology and is at the forefront of writing our social 
ontology: this is what we learn initially from Derrida’s, and then Ferraris’, philosophy of writing. 
Weak textualism is shown to be at its most pertinent when one asks the question ‘what is there 
inside the computer?’: ‘An enormous mass of registration and inscription, just as there is in your 
mobile phone and in so many other gadgets. I think it would be harder to find a stronger proof of 
weak textualism.’ 179 Thus, Ferraris’ work on both the mobile phone as a device, and weak 
textualism as an ontological theory, explains the social and ontological grounding for sexting.  
 
  Turning to sexting, given that adolescents’ ‘habitual use of and reliance of digital technology as 
an essential means of peer networking’ is at an all-time high, 180 the mobile phone reigns in 
creating social objects. These include SMS, MMS, and platform hosted messages (‘WhatsApp,’ 
‘Snapchat,’ etc), as well as emails, and what have been defined as ‘web 2.0 activities’ 181 which 
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include social media posts. 182 Ferraris noted this in 2009 whilst writing a book which would be 
translated into English in 2013 as Documentality: Why It Is Necessary to Leave Traces. 183 
Because in 2009 all his projections from 2005 had been proved correct, by the release and 
exponential success of the Apple iPhone in 2007: ‘…the iPhone. What is futuristic about this? … 
the only speed that is used to measure its efficiency is that of its connection … it is more 
convenient for writing and registering.’ 184 Indeed, as per Professor John Naughton in 2016: 
 
The iPhone was the first real smartphone and it changed the world because it changed the way 
people connected to the net. It began the inexorable drift away from desktop and laptop computers 
as our gateways to the internet. In the next 10 years or so, another 5 billion of our fellow citizens 
will get internet connectivity, and almost all of them will acquire it via a smartphone. Which means 
that – as network infrastructure improves – people will be online for most of their waking lives. 185 
 
  This revolutionary moment attached to the most successful smartphone model signals the 
fruition of Ferraris’ theory on mobile phones and his ontology of weak textualism. It also serves 
to highlight what is at stake in understanding and then successfully legislating the behaviour 
associated with these devices, a task which the article now revisits.  
 
5. Sexting re-examined: social ontology and law.   
 
  This section uses Derrida’s and Ferraris’ works on digital technology and mobile phones to 
provide a nuanced assessment of sexting. Their works will be used to illustrate the technological 
developments, philosophical implications, and cultural resonances behind sexting, in order for 
the law surrounding this act to be made more representative of the world it aims to govern. This 
is an alternative methodology to the current positivist frameworks applied to this issue which, as 
aforementioned, tend to only focus on the, nevertheless significant, difficulties regarding whether 
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the acts in question should be prosecuted or not. 186 However, as noted by Nicola Henry and 
Anastasia Powell, attention needs to move beyond positivist accounts to investigate wider issues 
such as ‘service providers of online communities and social media networks’ 187 because these 
technological pathways and means allow for sexting to occur.  
 
Writing social objects. 
 
  The works referred to above offer profound reflections on what is currently happening in a 
world in which mobile phones are ubiquitous. At an unprecedented speed, hundreds – if not 
thousands – of millions of people are creating social objects via mobile writing machines and are 
weaving those objects into the ‘text’ of the internet. This ontological act is now occurring on an 
epic scale. The ‘Pew Research Center’ in Washington D.C. estimates that in late 2016, of the 
86% of Americans who use the internet, 79% of those use Facebook: 188 approximately 220 
million users. And of those 220 million users who are active on the world’s largest social media 
website, 77% of them own a smartphone: approximately 170 million people. 189 These figures 
are just from the United States, whereas it is estimated that globally there are 2 billion monthly 
Facebook users and the fastest growing proportion of those users use a mobile phone. 190 Turning 
to the app which is perhaps most infamous for sexting, ‘Snapchat,’ 191 this specifically mobile-
based platform hosts 158 million daily users who create 2.5 billion ‘snaps’ everyday. 192 This is 
an example of what Derrida hypothesised in 1993, whereby the addressee has become the 
addressor, 193 and exactly as Ferraris had hypothesised in 2005 whereby the world ‘rather 
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paradoxically, seems also to exist in the mobile phone.’ 194 There are now billions of social 
objects created every day and to ignore this truth in developing legislation is lunacy, if the law 
wishes to be adequately representative of the society it is supposed to govern, as is shown with 
the CJCA 2015’s prohibition of revenge pornography.      
 
  An understanding of contemporary digital culture illustrates that the third millennium is 
responsible for the creation of an entirely new world, in which the digital self is gathering 
prominence over the limited analogue self:    
 
…our lived experience is gravitating dramatically from the analog to the digital. The digital self, 
the second body of today’s liberal democratic citizen, is overtaking his analog physical existence 
and becoming far more permanent, durable, tangible, and demonstrable. 195 
 
  This new digital world, which Ferraris shows is as a real world as one occupied by rivers and 
mountains, has now drastically ‘outpaced both the law and technological limitations of prior 
generations.’ 196 And in a time where ‘the societal veil cloaking teenage sexuality has been lifted 
entirely and budding libidos have escaped from dim basements into cyber space,’ 197 the SOA 
2003 produces three consequent failures by ignoring this. 198 They relate to those ‘born digital,’ 
the legal boundaries attached to sexual behaviour, and the significance of age.    
 
Three flaws of the current law. 
 
1. Those ‘born digital.’ 
 
  The first failure relates to the adolescents who were ‘born digital.’ 199 These adolescents do not 
know a world without the internet and consequently their interactions with this omnipresent 
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network are starkly different to those from previous generations. For example, ‘most major 
aspects of their lives are mediated by digital technologies, from social interactions to academics 
to hobbies and entertainment.’ 200 Moreover, the ‘born digital’ generation experience life in 
which ‘digital technology is breaking down whatever semblance of boundaries existed … 
between the state, the economy, and private existence, between what could be called governing, 
exchanging, and living.’ 201 In this new epoch in which there is an increasing blur between work 
and play, public and private, exposition and intimacy, it is nonsensical to demarcate the internet 
as something ‘other’ than a real and tangible aspect of an individual’s personal life. Rather, 
‘[t]hese technologies are loved and felt to be central to life, and to young people’s sense of self. 
Indeed, life could be unthinkable without them.’ 202 This is Ferraris’ point when he states that the 
‘social objects’ which inhabit these digital technologies, such as the sexual image sent in a sext, 
‘possess an autonomy and a hard, obtrusive, cutting and sometimes even dramatic consistency, 
which makes them very different from shadows or dreams’: 203 in short, social objects are real 
and have profound impacts upon people’s lives. As has been documented with adolescent school 
girls in Britain: ‘Mobile technologies, and in particular smart phones, suffuse the everyday lives 
of young people, structuring and shaping their experiences. As this group of 14–15 year old girls 
told us, their mobiles are a constant from waking up in the morning to going to sleep at night.’ 
204 Thus, whereas older generations may see socializing through the internet as some sort of 
supplement to ‘real life,’ for the ‘born digital’ generation socialization via the internet and social 
objects is real life:  
 
Mobile digital technologies are coming to permeate more and more aspects of young people’s lives, 
with young people suggesting they would ‘die’ without their phones, that phones and social 
networks play a ‘massive part’ in their relationships, and are shaping most aspects of everyday 
lives. 205    
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  Thus the weaving of social objects into the ‘text’ of the internet is not merely a banal activity 
for ‘born digital’ adolescents, it is their lifeblood. Consequently, the internet then becomes a 
natural medium through which to express sexuality and sexual identity, as noted by Joshua 
Garrison who comments that ‘Web 2.0’ and ‘other interactive technologies, including the 
proliferation of inexpensive and embedded photographic and videographic equipment,’ have 
‘democratized’ pornography so that now ‘production itself has been decentered, and the 
boundaries between the pornographic consumer and producer have become blurred.’ 206 
Garrison’s sentiment affirms and evolves Derrida’s hypothesis from 1993, 207 whilst accurately 
accounting for how content creation has now, naturally, paved the way for sexting: ‘[s]exting 
could be viewed as merely an expression of teen sexuality in a digital age, reflecting a long-
documented trend of teens “using whatever technology is at hand to express themselves and 
share their behaviour with the world.”’ 208 As explained by Shaheen Shariff, apps such as 
Snapchat ‘are attractive to a captive generation of youth who test social boundaries online as 
their hormones rage.’ 209 She then makes the nuanced point that this is really ‘no different from 
when social relationships were developed in the back seat of a car at a drive-in’ in the 1950s. 210  
 
  Given this, there is great harm done to the lives of those who now find themselves dictated to 
by a law which has absolutely no understanding of what it means to engage in the creation of 
social objects as a natural action in the 21st century. Returning to Shariff’s insightful work, this is 
the huge problem with a legal system which ‘focus[es] on the kids’ behaviour as though they 
were living in a society without influences.’ 211 And from this then emerges the second point of 
failure: outdated legal boundaries given to sexual behaviour.  
                                                          
206 Joshua Garrison, ‘The Self-Porning of American Youth’ (2011) Vol.392 Counterpoints: the sexuality 
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207 Derrida and Stiegler (n 78), 53. 
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2. The legal boundaries of sexual activity. 
 
  It is perhaps at least some consolation that noted authorities and legal scholars have realised the 
violent irony in deeming those who are below the age of majority to be ‘child pornographers.’ 212 
A law which indiscriminately labels and sanctions all adolescents for their actions regarding 
sexting is simply not fit for purpose. In fact, it is pertinent to note that in England and Wales, at 
the time of writing, there has not yet been a single prosecution for sexting, despite the fact that 
the data points to tens of thousands of instances taking place. 213  This is no doubt due, in part, to 
the Crown Prosecution Service’s strong line of resistance against prosecution. 214 As well as this, 
official guidance from the ground-breaking NSPCC study into sexting from 2012 advises that:  
 
Importantly, unlike bullying, it cannot simply be generalised that all sexting is a problem. Thus any 
teacher must encompass within the discussion the recognition that young people are legitimately 
interested in their developing sexuality; thus exploring or playing with sexual ideas or relationships 
should not be ignored or rejected but issues of respect, consent and reciprocity in sexual 
relationships, including digital sexual communications should be discussed. 215 
 
  These evidential points signal towards a growing concern with the inaccurate, indiscriminate, 
and ill-thought legislation governing the sexual lives of adolescents with regards to sexting. The 
law which is in place requires amendment so that the consensual distribution of sexually explicit 
images is legal when done by those who are legally able to participate in the very activity which 
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is the subject of such imagery. As has been argued by the North American legal scholar Julia 
Halloran McLaughlin regarding the same difficulty faced in her own jurisdiction:  
 
Given the existing inconsistent treatment of the evolving rights of teens as they mature and the poor 
fit between child pornography law and teen sexting conduct, a law directed specifically at teen 
sexting is required to distinguish this conduct from that of pedophiles [sic.] and the purveyors of 
child pornography. 216   
 
  The implementation of a specific law regarding sexting, as opposed to mere reliance on a law 
which does not reflect the use of mobile phones, would be a sensible step for the law of England 
and Wales to take, given that the law is currently not being enforced due to its inadequacy. As 
the current law surrounding sexting is blind to the world foreseen by Derrida in the mid-1990s, 
and then explicated by Ferraris over ten years ago, it is clearly not fit for purpose. We are now 
living in an expository world in which the mobile phone, more than ever before, allows us as 
‘digital subjects’ – or ‘Homo digitalis’ – to ‘give ourselves up in a mad frenzy of disclosure’ 
where we ‘exhibit our most intimate details in play, in love, in desire’ 217 into a world of ‘social 
objects’ which is parallel to an analogue world of ‘physical objects.’ This then leads to the third 
failure of the SOA 2003, its illogical framing of the age of adolescents to which the law applies.  
 
3. What is an age? 
  
  The SOA 2003 effectively altered the age of a legal ‘child’ and in doing so it created an 
illogical distinction between the consensual age for corporeal and digital sexual activities: the 
former is 16 years of age whereas the latter is 18 years of age. This ill-thought distinction causes 
the difficulties seen above, given that digital communication is second-nature to born digital 
adolescents: ‘sexting simply is a way of representing or replicating one’s sexual corporeality.’ 218 
Such a distinction has long been a target for Derrida’s deconstructive critique, given that this 
critique shows that all phenomena – such as a person’s age – are inscribed within a limitless field 
of referentiality and thus do not exist without being constituted by relation to other external 
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phenomena: ‘The presence of an element is always a signifying and substitutive reference 
inscribed in a system of differences and the movement of a chain.’ 219 This critique drove 
Derrida’s scepticism of discrete ages being used to impose legal boundaries because any given 
discrete age is subject to slippage whereby it is constituted both by inscribed references to other 
ages and by the stipulated rights, obligations, or legal physiognomies of those other ages.  
 
  As an example, writing in 2000, Derrida was extremely critical of a 1989 death penalty case, 
Penry v. Lynaugh, in which the U.S. state of Texas sought to execute a convicted criminal who 
was of a suitable legal age (‘twenty-two years old at the time of the crime’) but only the mental 
age of a child (‘but, according to the experts, had the mental age of a six-and-a-half-year-old-
boy’). 220 Here, deconstruction allowed Derrida to interrogate the concept of ‘an age,’ and to ask 
‘[w]hat is an age and at what age is a subject legally responsible?’ 221 Derrida’s questioning 
aimed to highlight that an age, whatever it may be, is composed of: 
 
the multiplicity of mental and social ages in each of us, but also by the more serious existence of 
the differences between the age of so-called mental, social consciousness, etc., and the age, if there 
is one, of the unconscious. 222  
 
  Because deconstruction reveals that a singular age is always multifaceted – ‘the multiplicity of 
ages, our ages, of the heterogenous ages that divide up our lives as mortals’ 223 – Derrida’s work 
has a criminological impact in critiquing the SOA 2003. His work deconstructs legal subjectivity 
on a metaphysical level and consequently enriches the positivist critique of legal subjectivity in 
the work of Fenhalls, 224 McLaughlin, 225 and Shariff. 226 By developing the critique of the 
different consensual ages for corporeal and digital sexual activities Derrida’s work offers an 
important critique of the conceptual apparatus which drives legal reasoning: ‘law has not 
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reckoned with this other thinking of age even though, as you know, … penal discourse has been 
obsessed … with the question of legal age.’ 227 Against the obsession whereby discrete ages 
purport to provide truths of the world on a metaphysical level, Derrida’s work shows the illogical 
fallacy underpinning this legal reasoning; a discrete age which acts as a legal boundary is in fact 
already infused with elements outside itself.  
 
  The occurrence of these three flaws resulting from the nonsensical application of a 
technologically out-dated law serve as evidence that the law requires change, whereby it can 
account for a world inclusive of prevalent, consensual, sexually explicit social objects. Having 
now assessed this landscape, made evident by Derrida’s and Ferraris’ work, the article now 
moves to examine developments in Australian law which may illustrate a remedy for the ill-fated 
implementation of the SOA 2003. The move to Australian case-study seeks to conclude this 
article by suggesting a suitable legal framework for the social ontology explicated throughout.  
 
6. Conclusion: legislating sexting.  
 
  In 1995 Virilio stated that digital technologies would find their niche in, amongst other 
situations, connecting lovers at a distance: ‘distancing brings (interactive) lovers together.’ 228 
Virilio believed this connection, as Derrida had noted, 229 would occur at near instantaneous 
speeds: everything is ruled by lightning, and the coup de foudre of disunited lovers suddenly 
becomes a coup de grâce.’ 230 With the ubiquity of the mobile phone and prevalence of sexting it 
appears that Virilio’s premonition, like Ballard’s aforementioned vision, has rung true. And in 
Australia the country now faces the consequences of this new age in which legislation, just like 
in England and Wales, is drastically outdated. But there are legislative initiatives currently 
underway in Australia which could serve as blueprints for future amendments to the law of 
England and Wales, which urgently needs to reflect how adolescents use their ‘absolute device.’   
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An Australian case-study: re-examining sexting laws. 
 
  In Australia it has come to light that in the states of Queensland and Victoria the act of sexting 
is not adequately accounted for in law. Drawing on its various reports, proposed legislative 
amendments, and recent findings, the case-study of Australia offers an interesting basis for future 
legal amendments in England and Wales. 
 
The state of Queensland. 
 
  The first point to note from the Australian example is the data recently released by the 
Sentencing Council for the state of Queensland. Their May 2017 document ‘Sentencing 
Spotlight on … child exploitation material (CEM) offences’ shows that between 1 July 2006 and 
30 June 2016 there were ‘3035 offenders’ responsible for ‘8198 CEM-related [Child Exploitation 
Material] offences.’ 231 Of these 3035 offenders 1565 were sentenced in court and 1470 were 
dealt with outside of the court. 232 What is most striking therein is the distinction between those 
dealt within inside, and outside of the court. Of the 1565 people sentenced in court less than 2% 
were under 17 years of age (28 people), whereas all of the 1470 people who were dealt with in 
ways other than penal sentences were under 17 years of age. 233 The reason for this striking 
distinction lies in the type of CEM-related act committed by adolescents: ‘The QPS [Queensland 
Police Service] advised the majority of CEM offences for which young offenders were diverted 
from court relate to sexting.’ 234 The QPS specifically diverted adolescents involved in sexting 
from the more serious sanctions delivered by the court because ‘this approach promotes an 
educative response for young people who are sexting unless specific circumstances warrant a 
more formal approach.’ 235 This is clear evidence that, like in England and Wales, the 
prosecutorial authorities have deliberately not seen sexting, by adolescents, as an equivalent 
illegal act to child pornography: ‘the behaviour conducted by young people in this context often 
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involves different circumstances to an adult sending or viewing CEM.’ 236 Further, this 
differentiation is highlighted in Queensland’s follow-up final report ‘Classification of child 
exploitation material for sentencing purposes,’ 237 in which it notes that because there exists both 
sexting which is ‘consensual sexting between two people’ and that which, akin to revenge 
pornography, is ‘the forwarding or releasing of images to other parties without consent,’ 238 there 
therefore must exist: 
 
…a range of options to respond appropriately to individual cases, for example, educative responses 
for sexting, with stronger justice responses when sexting may in fact be associated with more 
exploitive or coercive aspects. 239 
 
  This ideal for a ‘range of options’ adheres to the report’s comment that it shares the ‘concern 
that young people are criminalised for sexting,’ something which it adds ‘has been raised in 
several jurisdictions.’ 240 Again, this assessment coalesces with much of what has been made 
clear from the context of England and Wales. Building on this, the legislative proposals from the 
state of Victoria then provide suggestions for the next step in developing suitable law for sexting.  
 
The state of Victoria. 
 
  Like the state of Queensland, the state of Victoria has investigated, and is currently 
implementing, how to alter its law regarding child pornography, child exploitation material, and 
sexting, to produce legislation which is fitting for the 21st century. To that end, there is currently 
an amendment in the ‘Sex Offenders Registration Amendment (Miscellaneous) Bill 2017’ which 
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would grant a right of appeal to those convicted of child sex offences for having received an 
indecent photo from an adolescent under the age of 18: 241  
 
The Bill introduces a scheme enabling young adults who are found guilty of one or more specified 
sex offences to apply in limited circumstances for a court order exempting them from being 
“automatically” registered upon being sentenced (a “registration exemption order”). Persons who 
have already been “automatically” registered as a result of being sentenced for a specified offence 
before the commencement of this Bill will also be able to apply for a registration exemption order 
removing them from the Register of Sex Offenders. 242 
 
  This necessity of the amendment results from the recent attention which has been given to 
sexting – as illustrated via Queensland’s reports – in which it has been discovered that this 
activity is not adequately accounted for in law. From the ‘Explanatory Memorandum,’ just 
referred to, in an explanation of Clause 7 of the bill it notes that: 
 
The purpose of these order is to give the courts greater discretion to prevent the “automatic” 
registration of young adults sentenced for specified offences where they are not a risk, or are only a 
low risk, to the sexual safety of one or more persons or of the community. 243       
 
  Accordingly, at the court’s discretion, an adolescent registered as a sex offender could have 
their record expunged should they meet certain criteria. Such criteria include that the applicant 
was either 18 or 19 years old at the time of the offence, that they pose no, or a low, risk to the 
sexual safety of the community, that they have not been found guilty of other related offences, 
and that the adolescent in question is, or was, over 14 years old. 244 So, for example, if an 18 
year-old took pictures of their 17 year-old sexual partner with their personal mobile phone, with 
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their consent and only for the partner’s gratification, and these were the only instances which 
would make the 18 year-old liable for registration, then it may well be that their record could be 
expunged by the court. In summary, this practical amendment seeks to provide a way around the 
illogical and severe sanction which currently operates against consensual adolescent sexting and 
consequently should be considered as an option for England and Wales, short of full scale 
reform.   
 
Concluding thoughts. 
 
  The current landscape of digital technology is immense. The number of social objects which 
inhabit this landscape is gargantuan. As correctly hypothesised by Derrida in 1993, billions of 
people around the world now create and share their own digital content via the internet: ‘those 
who were previously in the position of consumer-spectators can intervene in the market.’ 245 At 
the heart of this still growing movement is the mobile phone, ‘the absolute device,’ 246 which 
Ferraris, ten years ago, described as ‘perfectly embody[ing]’ the writing system for social 
ontology. 247 He has, arguably, been proved right, as this device now heralds a new dawn for 21st 
living. And the complication which has arisen regarding sexting is but one of a myriad of 
complications which the law is currently dealing with and will no doubt have to deal with in the 
future. However the requirement of acknowledging the digital topology of today’s world is 
paramount in providing a legal system which coalesces with contemporary life. This is evidently 
the case with regards to sexting within the res publica and once again recalls an insight gleaned 
from a deconstructive methodology:  
 
What circulates on the internet, for instance, belongs to an automatic space of publication: the 
public/private distinction is already being wiped out there, with the lawsuits, the allegations of 
rights and legitimation that proliferate from that, but also the movements toward the appropriation 
of the res publica. Today this is one of the big political issues – it is politics. 248 
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